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The recent crisis in public finance that has characterized most Western countries has 
stoked  renewed  interest  in  the  possibility  of  reducing  government  expenditure  by 
reforming  the  health-care  system.  After  reviewing  the  origins  of  today’s  state 
intervention  in  this  field,  the  present  paper  argues  that  policy-makers  will  certainly 
strive  to  contain  health-care  of  expenditure.  Yet,  it  also  claims  that  unless  the 
ideological context that has favoured the birth and development of the current systems 
undergoes significant transformation, reform in this area is bound to remain elusive. In 
particular,  the  myth  of  social  justice  and  the  concept  of  human  dignity  need  to  be 
reassessed.  The  outcome  of  this  process  will  determine  to  which  extent  state 
intervention in the health sector will lose its rent-seeking connotations, while increasing 
attention  will  underscore  critical  phenomena  to  which  the  principle  of  individual 
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1  Introduction: three dilemmas for public finance 
Most  advanced  economies  are  currently  experiencing  severe  problems  with  public 
finance. Their debt-to-GDP ratios frequently exceed the taxing 60% limit, and their 
deficits-to-GDP ratios are well above the dreaded 3% threshold.
1 Moreover, it is widely 
agreed that in many Western countries tax pressure has reached the limit, in that further 
increases would generate substantial tax evasion, discourage entrepreneurial risk taking 
and  lead  to  loss  of  consensus  for  the  incumbent  political  coalitions.  As  a  result, 
decision-makers are confronted with three dilemmas.
2 First, they must choose whether 
to make an effort to stabilize their debt, or simply default, possibly forcing creditors to 
accept delayed reimbursement at reduced interest rates. Once choice falls on the first 
option (stabilization), policy-makers must then decide whether they want to increase 
taxation  and  risk  losing  consensus,  or  rather  take  action  in  order  to  decrease  the 
expenditure/GDP ratio. Not surprisingly, the fear of losing power tends to prevail. The 
third dilemma, therefore, regards how to proceed in order to cut expenditure and/or 
enhance real GDP growth. In both cases, the problem boils down to reducing the weight 
of  the  welfare  state  in  modern  societies,  e.g.  by  cutting  redistribution,  removing 
                                                 
1 The Debt/GDP variable (α) stays constant when the ratio between new debt (d·Debt= the budget deficit) 
and new GDP (y·GDP) equals the old ratio α, that is when (d·Debt)/(y·GDP) = α, or δ/y = α, where 
δ=(d·Debt)/GDP. In this context, Buiter et al. (1993: 62-63) suggested that the thresholds mentioned in 
the text – the so-called Maastricht criteria − were determined (1) by assuming a long-run average annual 
nominal growth rate of 5% for the EMU area, (2) by following the “golden rule of public finance”, 
according to which current expenditure ought to be financed by current revenue and (3) by observing that 
during 1974-91 public investment in the EC area was about 3% of GDP. Thus, if δ=3% and y=5%, the 
debt/GDP  ratio  does  not  explode  as  long  as  the  initial  debt/GDP  ratio  (α)  remains  within  the  60% 
boundary.   
2 Surely, the dilemmas can be dissipated by inflating away the denominator of the α ratio (nominal GDP), 
a solution to which governments have frequently turned in the past by happily increasing the money 
supply. Yet, this seemingly convenient way out may not be viable when (1) creditors are voting citizens 
aware of the disarray and losses brought about by high inflation and/or (2) governments are unable to run 
large enough budget surpluses and are thus obliged to service maturing debt (interest and principal) by 




privileges and guarantees: in a word, by drastically diminishing the role of government 
as a producer of goods and services as well as a regulator.
3  
 
Within  this  context,  state-controlled  and  state-run  health  services  deserve  special 
consideration. On one hand, health care currently accounts for a significant share of 
public expenditure in the whole OECD area (about 14%). At first sight, therefore, it 
might appear an attractive candidate for cost-cutting reforms. Yet, its appeal should not 
be  overestimated,  especially  –  and  paradoxically  –  in  countries  with  problematic 
accounts.  Returning  to  our  previous  remarks  on  the  conditions  for  stabilization,  an 
increase in public expenditure on health that would cause the budget deficit to jump 
from 3% to 4% of GDP would require a nominal 6.7% GDP growth rate in an economy 
with  tolerable  public  debt  (α=0.6),  but  a  mere  4%  GDP  growth  rate  in  a  troubled 
country (where α>1). Furthermore, one should note that social insurance
4 has been one 
of  the  touchstones  of  the  implicit  social  contract  that  has  gradually  taken  shape  in 
Western societies over the past one hundred years. Today, the presence of the state in 
health matters is characterized by intense ideological and psychological elements that 
enjoy  worldwide  recognition
5  and  cannot  be  easily  removed  by  technocratic 
                                                 
3  The  positive  correlation  between  economic  freedom  (including  deregulation)  and  growth  is  not 
discussed here. See for instance De Haan et al. (2006) as  well as  Czeglédi and Kapás (2009) for a 
rigorous review of the literature.  
4  Following  Shapiro  (2007:  11),  we  define  social  insurance  as  an  institutional  arrangement  run  by 
government.  It  aims  at  spreading  across  large  groups  of  individuals  the  cost  of  harmful  events  and 
features three elements: compulsion, personal irresponsibility (premiums are not connected with expected 
costs) and regulated supply.  
5 See for instance articles 22, 25 and 29 of the Universal declaration of Human Rights. The declaration 
was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948. Article 22 guarantees 
the right to social security and of all social and cultural rights indispensable of the individual’s dignity 
and the development of his personality. Article 25 establishes the right of everyone to a standard of 
leaving adequate for the health of himself and of his family. Article 29 makes the individual subject to 
those rules that are deemed necessary for the general welfare of a democratic society. The emphasis on 
health is not shared by many European constitutions. Yet, most European constitutions emphasize that 
individual freedom can be limited by the law or the public interest. For instance, while article 32 of the 




prescriptions. These two elements – the weak budgetary appeal in troubled countries 
and the momentous presence of resilient ideological components – explain why credible 
reform in this area requires first and foremost drastic changes in how people regard 
government  intervention.  Questioning  the  current  notions  of  compulsory  solidarity, 
shared liability and social justice – and possibly replacing them with those of human 
dignity, individual responsibility and natural rights – is more critical than impassive 
accounting exercises carried out by ministerial officials. As will be explained in these 
pages, coming to grips with these psychological and moral components will play an 
even  bigger  role  when  a  third  category  of  impediments  is  considered,  i.e.  the 
institutional costs of transition typical of a distorted economy. In short, the key issues 
are  rent-seeking,  inefficient  judicial  systems,  social  tensions,  and  they  are  easily 
dispelled by technocratic wands.  
 
In  particular,  we  posit  that  unless  the  ideological  context  undergoes  significant 
transformation,  reform  in  the  health  industry  is  bound  to  remain  elusive.  The 
downsizing  of  government  in  this  area  is  surely  likely  to  generate  significant 
improvements in economic performance.
6 Yet, absent substantial ideological changes, 
the destruction of the deeply-rooted sociological components inherited from the past 
and of the current, pervasive rent-seeking mechanisms might provoke substantial short-
run  opposition,  possibly  shored  up  by  pockets  of  unemployment  and  magnified  by 
social unrest. Put differently, technocratic recipes are likely to  generate institutional 
stalemate and diffused conflict, rather than efficiency-enhancing reform. The following 
sections aim at analyzing the main questions raised by these sets of issues and showing 
                                                                                                                                               
individual  and  as  a  collective  interest”,  article  14  of  the  German  Constitution  states  that  the  use  of 
property “shall also serve the public good” and that “property and the right of inheritance … shall be 
defined by the laws”.  
6 Privatized health care is clearly more efficient than the state-run alternative (e.g., Le Grand 2007): by 
giving people the power to choose, competition reduces shirking, leads to services of higher quality and 
also offers a powerful stimulus to the research and development of new drugs and treatments. In truth , 
there is a reputed literature, according to which the welfare state can enhance efficiency. Yet, event these 
authors emphasize that the state should redistribute income and wealth, and neglect the role of the state as 




that there can be no real solution, lest one clarifies the moral ambiguities typical of 
today’s welfare states, health being no exception.  With this vision in mind, section 2 
examines the two original models that have inspired state intervention in the health-care 
industry during the 20
th century; section 3 draws on this distinction in order to discuss 
the  prospects  for  reform;  section  4  elaborates  on  the  role  and  dynamics  of  moral 
legitimacy. Section 5 briefly summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2  Bismarck, Beveridge and the role of government  
The history and patterns of public intervention in the health system track two basic 
models. One originated from the paternalistic approach that characterized the legislation 
on  social  security  introduced  in  the  1880s  by  chancellor  Otto  von  Bismarck  in 
Germany.  According  to  this  model,  the  state  should  ensure  that  all  the  working 
members  of  the  nation  are  provided  with  minimum  health  services.  Given  the 
corporatist nature of society typical of the Second Reich, employers were thus required 
to establish and contribute to satisfactory sectorial insurance schemes, while the state 
would  have  regulatory  and  supervisory  functions,  for  example  with  regard  to  the 
amounts and quality of the services provided. This vision does not exclude that the state 
might  also  choose  to  produce  health  care.  Yet,  the  core  of  the  Bismarck  system  is 
dominated by the presence of a set of private insurers created by – or connected with –
employers, financed by employees and employers and supervised by the government. 
These  insurers  buy  health  services  from  private  providers  (e.g.  doctors)  and  state 
providers (e.g. state hospitals) in order to cover the needs of workers and their families.  
 
The  second  model  is  named  after  Lord  William  Beveridge,  who  formalized  his 
proposals  for  a  British  National  Health  Service  in  1942,  although  the  system  had 
actually been conceived by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill in 1911 and made 
operational  by  Aneurin  Bevan  in  1948  (Bartholomew  2004).  The  essence  of  the 
Beveridge system is fairly simple. The state provides comprehensive health insurance 
and services to all citizens, with no intermediaries. Supply must adapt to demand and 




possibly filtered by the doctor’s judgment and willingness to accept responsibilities for 
faulty diagnoses. Financing comes from general taxation. Within this context, private 
providers  are  not  generally  outlawed,  but  they  are  meant  to  be  ancillary,  bridging 
temporary government shortcomings and taking care of patients requiring high-quality 
accommodation standards. 
 
These models are still with us today, albeit in different versions. In the Bismarckian 
context, for instance, sometimes the (paternalistic) state is no longer an intermediary 
and  simply  enforces  the  creation  of  personal  health  accounts.
7  In  other  cases  the 
intermediary  is  a  regional  public  authority,  as  in  the  Swiss  cantons;  and  in  most 
countries, insurance policies benefit from substantial government subsidies, as in the 
Netherlands. Everywhere, however, policy-makers inspired by  Beveridge and  Bevan 
had to back down from the universal ambitions of the founders. Thus, health services no 
longer cover all kinds of needs free of charge and local authorities might complement 
intervention by the centre, as in Italy. Yet, the main principles driving such two systems 
have not been questioned. The common assumption is that health is too important to fall 
victim to individuals’ irrationality and propensity to cheat (lack of foresight and free 
riding  on  people’s  charitable  instincts,  respectively);  to  the  budget  constraints 
characterizing  vast  layers  of  the  population;  or to  the  vagaries  of  nature,  for  which 
nobody can be held liable. In the end – this is the traditional reasoning in favour of 
government  intervention  –  social  action  must  replace  individual  engagement  and 
responsibility, and compensate for dishonesty or bad luck. In other words, state control 
on the provision of health services seems to have become part and parcel of a social 
                                                 
7 According to this approach, each individual who does not subscribe to a life-time insurance plan is 
required to put aside a set amount of money during his working life. This sum is credited to an account 
that remains his property, matures interest, can only be utilized to buy health services and is transferable 
to other people if it is not fully utilized before passing away (see for instance Prewo 1996: ch. 4). A 
similar scheme – Medisave, supplemented with state-funded insurance against catastrophic illness – has 




contract designed to obtain something desirable:
8 a contract that no person would turn 
down other than for cheating, greed, sheer ignorance or high transaction costs.
9 
 
No matter one’s opinion about the explicit and implicit principles mentioned above, it is 
undeniable that when one observes reality, both models – Bismarck’s paternalism and 
Beveridge’s  socialism  –  have  performed  rather  well.  Much  as  one  might  criticize 
national health programs for their inefficiency, most of them have met with unmitigated 
success in political terms. Certainly, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence documenting 
people’s discontent with the kind of health-care they get. Yet, public opinion remains 
far from hostile to a health system controlled by the state.
10 Citizens do want better care 
(who wouldn’t, if one has the illusion that it comes at little or no extra charge?), but 
most  individuals  do  not  advocate  private  service  to  replace  state  provision,  and 
straightforward deregulation is not even on the agenda. Again, that is hardly surprising, 
since this attitude comes from a state of mind according to which health is considered a 
social  right,  rather  than  a  service  to  be  purchased;  individuals  should  not  be  held 
responsible when hit by disease or accident, especially when medical treatments are 
available;  society  should  devote  more  resources  to  compensate  for  people’s 
vulnerability and biological weaknesses. In a word, poor health has become perceived 
as an unfair barrier to one’s legitimate efforts to enjoy satisfactory living standards and 
maintain their social dignity. Thus, offsetting the “natural unfairness” of illness and 
physical incapacity has become a social duty (Allsop 1996, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert 
2009). The upshot is that more drugs and medical care are demanded and the socially-
conscientious decision-maker is expected to make them available. 
                                                 
8 Somewhat ironically, those advocating state intervention in order to compensate for individual cognitive 
failures and duplicity claim that they consider individuals “as caring human beings and sharing citizens 
rather than as self-interested consumer” (MacGregor 2005: 148). 
9 The nature of such costs will be clarified at the end of this section.   
10 Brown and Khoury (2009) present a 2009 Gallup poll covering OECD countries offering universal 
health coverage: it appears that 79% of the population were satisfied with the quality of healthcare in their 
city or area and 73% had confidence in their national healthcare or medical system. These percentages fall 




As we know, our elected representatives have thrust their hands deep into taxpayers’ 
pockets and answered generously. Independent of the origin of the system (Bismarck or 
Beveridge), today’s Treasuries cover a significant share of total expenditure on health. 
But this munificence has come at a cost: overall economic growth has been lower than 
anticipated and the room for maneuvering has been gradually shrinking. Worries for the 
future are thus well founded.  
 
 
3  Grappling with budget constraints 
To be fair, a purely Bismarckian context should present no major problems. If the health 
system is characterized by state paternalism, expenditure amounts to what it takes to 
define the content of the basic, compulsory health package that would do away with the 
consequences  of  individual  misbehaviour  (deviousness  or  lamentable  stupidity);  and 
enforce its purchase. The cost of defining a package monitoring that people actually buy 
it cannot amount to a very substantial sum. In fact, when Bismarck-related schemes face 
financial troubles – as in Germany or in the Netherlands in these years – their origins 
relate to the socialist elements they have absorbed through time, rather than to the traits 
of their initial scheme. 
 
By  contrast,  the  budget  constraint  features  prominently  in  the  system(s)  created  by 
Beveridge.  In  these  contexts,  financial  pressure  stems  from  demand-  and  supply-
induced causes. With regard to demand, it is apparent that a community characterized 
by an increasingly idle population is likely to consume health services in ever greater 
quantities, especially when technological progress boosts expectations about outcomes 
and  the  role  of  the  family  as  a  care-taking  institution  weakens.  More  time  is  thus 
devoted to medical testing,
11 while mishaps or diseases formerly considered fatal in the 
past  become  the  object  of  successful  treatment,  albeit  sometimes  at  high  costs. 
                                                 
11 In particular, testing grows rapidly in order to reduce the probability of making mistakes and to shift at 
least part of the responsibility from humans to machines. This often leads to the higher costs typical of the 
so-called premium-medicine (Kling 2006). Moreover, testing potentially multiplies the number of people 
involved with a single patient, thereby making it harder to single out who is responsible for misjudgments 
or catastrophic decisions. Of course, this phenomenon is typical of all bureaucracies, especially when the 




Gatekeepers may be put in place, but they are only partially effective, since nobody 
wants  to  be  taken  to  court  by  unhappy  or  greedy,  opportunistic  patients  and  their 
relatives; or to be harassed by ambitious magistrates eager to make headlines. As far as 
supply  is  concerned,  the  extensive  rent-seeking  activities  carried  out  by  overblown 
administrative structures, the well-entrenched groups of suppliers and the large numbers 
of unqualified or sluggish medical  and paramedical staff are just too  eager to meet 
demand,  ask  for  additional  resources,  create  new  pockets  of  inefficiency.  Granted, 
efforts to cut costs on the supply side have not been altogether fruitless: the introduction 
of  competition  among  state  providers,  or  between  state  and  private  providers,  has 
indeed  allowed  the  central  planner  to  obtain  valuable  information  about  production 
costs  and  to  avoid  some  wastage.  But  the  gains  in  efficiency  related  to  these 
experiments in “managed competition” are minor in comparison with the booming costs 
provoked by the increase in production driven by virtually unlimited demand.  
 
In the end, first-come-first-serve rationing has been introduced to remedy the situation. 
As a result, waiting lists have become common in many countries, occasionally with 
dramatic  consequences.
12  Furthermore,  an  increasing  number  of  drugs  and  medical 
treatments are no longer free, even if subsidies remain significant. More generally, the 
public has accepted that society cannot afford to keep its socialist promise: whether or 
not health is considered a fundamental right of each individual, it cannot be provided in 
unlimited quantities to all members of the community. Instead, health (and welfare in 
general)  has  become  the  instrument  through  which,  when  strangled  by  budgetary 
hardship,  the  political  class  offers  individuals  a  new  deal,  which  could  be  named 
“targeted redistribution”. It focuses on containing public expenditure by tweaking the 
rules  of  the  game  in  important  areas,  such  as  pensions  and  education;  and  by 
introducing  new  health-policy  criteria.  These  criteria  would  consist  in  targeting  the 
adverse circumstances that can hardly be influenced by personal efforts, but seriously 
                                                 
12 Emergency-room doctors have discretion in allowing patients to jump the queue, but they have no 
power to hire new doctors. As a result, patients often keep waiting their turn in emergency rooms, rather 
than at home. Not surprisingly, in order to avoid the worst, significant numbers of patients ignore state 




affect one’s living standard, independent of the income class to which the individual 
belongs; and in heavily subsidizing the cost of bearing with such mishaps. 
 
 
3.1  The stumbling blocks: three categories of transaction costs 
So much for the efforts to contain expenditure. One may wonder, however, why the 
public generally stops short of advocating more radical change in the health sector. Why 
are state-managed charity and Rawlsian redistribution not enough, despite their greater 
transparency? Why has the state become engaged as a (rather inefficient) producer of 
health services? And how can we account for the deep resistance to move from social 
insurance  to  Rawls,
13  despite  today’s  disillusionment  with  Beveridge’s  faith  in  the 
infinite  wisdom  and  unfettered  commitment  of  civil  servants,  the  acknowledged 
weakness of the traditional argument based on the presence of market failures
14 and the 
increasing evidence about government dysfunctions?    
 
As a matter of fact, the difficulties met by radical reform in this area come from the 
production side. In brief, and especially in the world of Beveridge, much of the state 
provision of health services has been powered by the decision-makers’ ability to exploit 
people’s  trust  in  bureaucratic  planning.  Policy-makers  have  thus  succeeded  in  (1) 
creating  strong  rent-seeking  groups  supporting  and  legitimizing  further  exercises  in 
policy-making and (2) establishing new areas in which political élites gather consensus, 
develop  alliances  and  offer  privileges  to  their  supporters.  These  two  elements  are 
critical, since when the social contract is framed in such a way that (1) and (2) are 
tolerated and perhaps even welcomed for a long enough period of time, Bismarck is 
                                                 
13  We  refer  here  to  Rawls’s  initial  proposal,  according  to  which  the  state  should  equalize  monetary 
incomes across the population, without interfering with the structures of consumption and production.  
14 See for instance Scott (2001: 25-29) for a list of the traditional market failures that are assumed to 
justify government intervention in the health sector. The claim in favour of entrusting the state with 
producing merit goods is also weak. Those advocating Rawlsian redistribution confined to such goods can 




replaced by Beveridge and three categories of transaction costs make backpedaling all 
but  impossible.  These  are  the  cost  of  agreeing  on  a  new  and  more  transparent 
redistributive covenant; the cost of dealing with the social tensions provoked by rent-
seeking groups whose privileges are threatened; and the cost of interacting with a poor 
judicial system. The first two points are obvious. As noted above, the state provision 
and administration of health services is accompanied by the rise of powerful interest 
groups  that  gradually  transform  their  status  into  sets  of  privileges.  Poor  skills  or 
shirking are the most visible consequences, as well as their unwillingness to operate in a 
competitive environment. Furthermore, this system offers political élites opportunities 
to consolidate  and possibly  expand their power, e.g. by  expanding the  bureaucracy. 
None of these groups will give in without a fight. With regard to the third component, 
we  argue  that  when  choosing  between  a  privately  operated  system  (perhaps 
complemented by transparent income transfers) and a state-operated system, citizens 
face a rather simple alternative. Either they deal with possibly sluggish state employees 
under little pressure to economize on costs; or they confront private insurers that might 
offer better care, but are also eager to contain costs and likely to create conflicts to be 
solved  in  court,  which  can  often  be  expensive,  time-consuming  and  frustrating. 
Choosing  between  the  two  scenarios  is  not  obvious.  A  snail-paced  counterpart  who 
eventually gives in to most your requests might well be preferable to a tough guy who 
challenges you to go to court and for whom the marginal cost of doing so is very low. In 
other words, spending your time persuading a bureaucrat is not necessarily inferior to 
wasting your time and your money in court.  
 
 
3.2  From the illusion of  bureaucratic wisdom to managed competition and targeted 
redistribution 
If our analysis is correct, the future of the traditional European welfare state is relatively 
easy  to  characterize.  On  one  hand,  it  is  clear  that  despite  much  drum  banging  for 
improving managed competition and absent fundamental changes in public views about 
the scope of personal responsibility vis-à-vis health care, significant results will follow 




In fact, and rather ironically, in several cases managed competition has indeed become a 
euphemism for these very measures.
15 On the other hand, the core of the debate will 
have to move from finding out how to manage competition more effectively, to defining 
the kinds of treatments that deserve to be funded by the state (targeted redistribution). 
Finally,  the  outcome  will  also  depend  on  the  size  of  the  incumbent  rent-seeking 
coalitions,  which  are  particularly  burdensome  where  socialist  schemes  prevail  and 
which can easily abort most reforms. For instance, rather than being a useful device to 
keep  expenditure  under  control  (as  in  the  Bismarckian  context),  targeting  under 
Beveridge might well focus on ensuring that jobs and inefficiencies in the public sector 
are preserved.  
 
To summarize, Bismarckian countries could move their national health scheme towards 
a “targeted redistribution” pattern with no great trouble. In their case privatization is 
clearly a feasible option, since the rent-seeking elements are neither too strong, nor too 
harmful. True, public opinion can hardly see its necessity, but that is another story. By 
contrast, in the world of Beveridge the real beneficiaries of the system are first and 
foremost  the  administrators  of  those  programmes  and  the  politicians,  followed  by  a 
significant portion of the providers and the suppliers involved, among whom shirking 
and  overpricing  are  widespread.  These  groups  might  not  resist  the  introduction  of 
market  pricing  into  the  welfare  system  (managed  competition  or  specific  forms  of 
targeted redistribution), but in order to protect their privileges they are bound to oppose 
privatization and competition vigorously.  
 
Unfortunately,  those  who  have  an  interest  in  galvanizing  against  these  coalitions 
hesitate, and for good reason: they fear the transaction costs mentioned earlier and they 
                                                 
15  A  telling  example  has  been  provided  by  the  proposal  to  reform  the  British  NHS  put  forward  by 
Cameron’s government in January 2011. According to this plan, health would still be supplied free of 
charge, but it  would be provided by consortiums of doctors. These consortiums  would be allotted a 
budget and a price list with which the buyers (i.e. the doctors, on behalf of their patients) must comply. Of 
course, once the budget has been spent, patients should not get sick until the funding for the next year is 




sensibly mistrust politicians’ assurances about the benefits (lower tax rates or offsetting 
income transfers). Certainly, people are no longer taken by the socialist illusions of 
happiness free of charge. Yet, they are still persuaded that they have struck a deal, in 
that by paying taxes they have subscribed to a soft social contract which includes a set 
health package more or less independent of the subscribers’ incomes. Politicians are 
their counterparts. And politicians have an interest in ensuring that the package is as 
generous  as  (financially)  possible  and  in  relieving  the  citizen  of  several  irksome 
incumbencies: deciding how much consumption should be sacrificed in order to pay for 
health; choosing an adequate provider; comparing prices; engaging in preventive care; 
taking  doctors  to  court  should  one  feel  duped  and  going  through  the  pains  of  an 
ineffective  judiciary.  In  short,  people  have  accepted  the  premise  that  health  is  “too 
important” to be decided by private individuals; thus, they are focused on wanting to 
reduce transaction costs – information gathering, choosing and planning, enforcement – 
and are convinced that their current arrangement meets their needs. As a consequence, 
they are willing to consider changing the details of the current health-care system, and 
possibly accept some restrictions, but they do not wish to abandon it and incur the cost 
of  fighting  daunting  rent-seeking  coalitions.  This  explains  why  there  are  plenty  of 
demands for reforms, improvements, rationalization; much less for drastic changes.  
 
 
4   Justice and human dignity 
Should we then conclude that economic hardship will not suffice to induce politicians to 
privatize our national health programs? As hinted in the introductory section, we believe 
that unless a radical change in attitudes is brought about, the answer is indeed in the 
negative. Individuals in paternalistic contexts don’t see the need for change, since in 
those countries public finance is still under control. On the other hand, although people 




reforms will offer adequate solutions to their public-finance problems
16 and eventually 
back down when confronting the risk of downsizing the rent-seeking structure. Public 
opinion does seem to realize that stabilizing public indebtedness without freezing public 
expenditure is going to be difficult. Nonetheless, the economic incentives to intervene 
on  state  health-care  do  not  seem  compelling:  keeping  public  expenditure  on  health 
under control will be important, but freezing it or revolutionizing the system is not 
deemed essential. For instance, state pensions are considered a much more promising 
target for cost-cutting exercises.
17  
 
Yet, the environment is not totally static. The crisis of the welfare state is manifest and 
its primary justification – the myth of social justice – begins to be the object of closer 
scrutiny. The moral validation for public health is no exception: in fact, the future of our 
health-care systems will eventually depend on the shared assessment of two interrelated 
issues:  the  concept  of  justice  (which  defines  equality  and  social  fairness)  and  the 
relationship between the concepts of justice and human dignity. The remaining parts of 
this section will address such two questions and explore how individuals might alter 
their perceptions in this regard.  
 
                                                 
16 The evidence in the UE15 area during the past decade shows that the ratio of public expenditure on 
health  to  GDP  in  the  two  groups  of  countries  is  roughly  the  same,  with  Greece  and  Spain  (both 
Beveridge) at the low end, and Germany and France (both Bismarck) at the top end. 
17 Intervention in this area may also have positive effects on growth (Eberstadt and Groth 2007). Not 
surprisingly, as long as individuals retire at a constant age, but their life gets longer, their burden on social 
care (including  health care)  increases. By contrast, if the “old” cohorts  were allowed to stay active, 
health-care could become a profitable social investment, rather than a drag on collective consumption and 




4.1  Justice, equality and the Aristotelian perspective 
According  to  its  most  discriminating  advocates,  a  compulsory,  universal  and  state-
financed  health-care  system  is  legitimized  by  its  intrinsic  morality.
18  Their  point  of 
departure is Aristotle’s vision, according to which “just” means “consistent with and 
enhancing  human  nature”  and  –  in  turn  –  “human  nature”  is  synonymous  with 
“flourishing”,  i.e.  with  one’s  inner  drive  and  right  to  discover  and  realize  his 
personality.  In this light, therefore,  government  intervention is morally justified and 
possibly imperative when it is designed to remove the impediments along one’s path to 
flourishing. It follows that justice and equality boil down to the same idea, the right to 
engage  in  the  flourishing  process  free  from  normative  barriers  and  violence.  In 
particular, a society is just if all its individuals are granted this condition. This is in fact 
the essence of the Aristotelian notion of equality.   
 
Now, the twist added to justify the environment advocated by Beveridge and Bevan 
consists in identifying flourishing either as a known final state, or as a set of desirable 
traits that the individual should enjoy when engaging in flourishing. Thus, this kind of 
flourishing – let us call it “social” flourishing – is not the process through which the 
individual  discovers  and  possibly  realizes  his  inner  nature.  Instead,  it  defines  the 
specific features of the outcome that the individual attains. Likewise, from this vantage 
point, a just institutional context is not one in which individual freedom is guaranteed, 
but rather one that ensures that those outcomes are obtained by all the members of the 
community  (Sen  1999).  This  is  the  essence  of  (social)  justice  and  (social)  equality. 
Health and socialist health-care fall squarely within this perspective, since it is obvious 
that sick people would find it hard (or harder) to flourish, both because their illness 
restrains their actions and because absent state intervention, the necessary treatments 
would absorb resources that otherwise would be devoted to pursuing the outcomes they 
would like to secure (social flourishing). Not surprisingly, according to this view, state 
intervention in health matters can thus be inefficient and even disappointing, but its role 
cannot be denied. Government regulation and production in this field might be subject 
                                                 
18 See for instance Ruger (2004 and 2007) for a clear statement of this thesis and references to the 




to changes and improvements, but they cannot be removed from the centre of the stage. 
Yet, however simple and demagogically attractive it might appear, we posit that this 
view is operationally ineffective and conceptually flawed.  
 
Its operational weaknesses stem from the fact that social actors in a world affected by 
scarcity choose among different desirable ways of enhancing their intellectual budding 
and growth. This is actually what flourishing is about – the individual discovery of 
one’s self. A person might focus on health, another one might want better education, a 
third one might require a guaranteed income and enough leisure to engage in a life of 
meditation free from earthly worries and hassles. In a word, there are many ways of 
flourishing and no clear criteria to rank the final results. By contrast, there are many 
ways  of  discouraging  flourishing,  all  of  them  deplorable.  For  instance,  denying  an 
individual his freedom to choose and depriving him of his earned income are surely 
among such ways. Yet, these are the very essence of regulation and taxation. Of course, 
deferring to the political process – public reasoning and democratic decision-making, as 
Ruger (2004) suggests to her readers – adds to the confusion. As we have mentioned in 
the earlier sections of this article, rather than enhancing conscious choice and individual 
responsibility, the enforcement of social justice opens the door to – and encourages – 
discretion, opportunism and rent-seeking. Whatever the legitimacy of policies inspired 
by  social  flourishing,  and  whatever  its  moral  foundations  (which  we  will  discuss 
shortly), the instruments to obtain social justice favour the birth of privileges, rather 
than individual fulfillment.  
 
From the conceptual vantage point, the Aristotelian interpretation put forward by the 
supporters of social flourishing overlooks that the philosophy of flourishing stems from 
a natural-law approach, not from centrally-designed priorities. In particular, the notion 
of  natural  law  underlying  the  process  of  Aristotelian  flourishing  is  the  principle  of 
freedom from coercion (ownership of one’s self and sacredness of property rights):
19 it 
does not consist of a set of positive rights, nor is it a list of desirable goods and services 
                                                 
19 See for instance Wright (2000), who offers a critical survey of the Aristotelian natural-law tradition 




to which a society should grant free access. Surely, the fact that such sets and lists are 
prepared by enlightened elites or are agreed upon through majority voting is not enough 
to  make  them  “right”  or  “natural”.  Likewise,  it  would  be  mistaken  to  argue  that 
flourishing can only be social and that it can only take place within a context featuring 
bundles of positive rights and their corresponding obligations falling upon those who 
must fund them. Instead, the Aristotelian meaning of “flourishing” refers to the purpose 
of life as the individual perceives it. It is the pursuit of virtue (eudaimonia or self-
fulfillment) through a process characterized by choice, as well as by trial and error. Put 
differently, the purpose of a society ruled by natural law is to ensure that its members 
can  freely  engage  in  their  ongoing  discovery  processes  punctuated  by  luck  and 
accidents, driven by a subjective evaluation of the outcomes,  and characterized by the 
material  rewards  and  punishments  produced  by  the  market  process.  Of  course,  the 
discovery  and  realization  of  one’s  self  can  be  enhanced  by  interacting  with  other 
individuals (society). Nonetheless, the yardstick of flourishing remains the individual, 
since  eudaimonia    is  definitely  an  individual  perception  and  the  point  of  arrival  an 
individual  journey.  Surely,  the  journey  takes  place  in  a  social  environment.  Yet,  it 
remains an individual experience. The so-called social good, therefore, is neither an 
outcome  nor  an  aggregate  objective  to  be  pursued  by  a  community  (or  its 
representatives). Instead, it is an institutional arrangement within which agents are free 




4.2  Justice and human dignity 
The upshot of the previous subsection is that in the Aristotelian world the individual is 
indeed a social and political animal, since interacting with other human beings is a key 
component of his flourishing. Yet, government has nothing to say about outcomes and 
relatively little about the way a person’s flourishing unfolds. In fact, the Aristotelian 
perspective  suggests  that  the  role  of  the  state  is  to  ensure  that  men  remain  free  to 
choose, that they are not hampered in their search for knowledge and that the driving 




and  large,  this  amounts  to  the  well-known  negative  notion  of  justice:  “just”  is  the 
opposite of “unjust”, and “unjust” is what violates the freedom-from-coercion principle.  
 
In this light, the ideas of justice, equality and human dignity are equivalent, for human 
dignity is in fact the (natural) right of being what one is, of being the owner of himself, 
of choosing according to one’s own inclination, no matter whether other people believe 
in priorities dictated by alleged meta-principles (e.g. religion or race), or by political 
processes  (e.g.  majority  or  supermajority  decision-making).  Men  can  benefit  from 
advice and guidance. But the decision to follow or to reject guidance remains one’s 
responsibility. Thus, there can be no justice without human dignity and there can be no 
human dignity without personal responsibility. By denying the freedom to choose, state 
intervention has then offended both justice and human dignity. In particular, as a result 
of taxation, regulation and production of merit goods, flourishing has become a social 
endeavor,  rather  an  individual  discovery;  the  rise  of  the  rent-seeking  coalitions  has 
emptied  the notion of social equality; and compulsory redistribution has violated the 
principle of equality broadly understood, since compulsory redistribution implies that 
human dignity is less and less important as one becomes richer. Put differently, state 
intervention  implies  that  choice  has  been  removed  from  the  individual  and  that 
individual responsibility is necessarily crowded out by arbitrary social criteria. In the 
end, individual decision-making has been replaced by the world of politics and all but 
unaccountable bureaucracies. 
 
The  moral  assessment  of  human  nature  and  social  interaction  does  not  change  its 
features when one focuses on health. Good health is of course desirable, but it comes at 
a cost. As a consequence, it becomes the object of choice, clearly more difficult and 
painful for the poor than for the rich. Yet, if one accepts the principles of flourishing 
and human dignity (justice), one must also accept that flourishing might not exhibit the 
same features for everybody, and that the meta-principle of justice has nothing to do 
with  end  states.  Flourishing  within  a  just  institutional  context  does  not  identify  a 
specific and objective goal, unless one calls “virtue” or eudaimonia a goal. Even less 
can one identify flourishing with the attainment of material targets, such as a given 




justice  and  human  dignity  are    end/goals  in  the  sense  that  they  are  guarantees  that 
enhance our freedom to choose, protect us against the possibility of being forced to 
serve somebody else’s goals and prevent others from aggressing our right to pursue 
virtue.  Those  advocating  state  intervention  in  the  realm  of  health,  therefore,  cannot 
appeal to the notions of justice or human dignity, since socialist health-care is in fact 




4.3  Where do we go from here? 
As we pointed out earlier, it is unlikely that state intervention in the health industry will 
be downsized because of financial stringency. It will be capped and gradually reformed, 
but the health budget per se is unlikely to cause major turnarounds. Nonetheless, it is a 
fact that people have lost faith in the bureaucrats’ ability to promote happiness and 
create wealth. Disillusion has already turned into mistrust, as generalized resentment 
against  taxation  and  privileges  mounts,  and  political  disenchantment  increases.  For 
present  purposes,  therefore,  the  challenge  is  to  assess  what  it  takes  to  transform 
resentment  into  illegitimacy  and  whether  this  changeover  might  be  sparked  in  –  or 
perhaps by – the health industry. 
 
A social arrangement loses legitimacy when it is generally perceived as unjust and the 
search  for  alternative,  fairer  solutions  takes  off.  Thus,  in  order  to  answer  the  first 
question, we should start from investigating how people perceive the notion of justice 
and what drives its dynamics. The answer to the second question will follow as an 
extension of those insights. 
                                                 
20 The verdict is perhaps less harsh with regard to the paternalist approach, which de facto denies the 
principle of human dignity in the presence of genetically induced shortsightedness and thus admits that, 
when  it  is  apparent  that  shortsightedness  leads  to  mistakes  that  are  systematically  regretted  ex  post, 
society might interfere with one’s flourishing. The burden of proof remains however on the advocates of 
paternalism, who would be required to show that flourishing is hampered by some kind of genetic bias 
resilient  to  man’s  evolutionary  history  and  that  “genetic  mistakes”  are  not  just  a  way  of  asking  for 




In their wide-ranging survey on the perception of justice, Robinson et al. (2007) have 
clearly and persuasively shown that individuals are genetically programmed to develop 
a sense of justice from the very early stages of their lives. This could be defined as “core 
justice”, according to which our sense of right and wrong comes from our genes and 
originates from an evolutionary process spanning millennia. But there is also a second 
layer of moral assessments, which is heavily influenced by the environment and gives 
substance to “consequentialist justice”. Consequentialist justice identifies a mechanism 
through which the individual understands and accepts an institutional context which has 
proven  to  be  stable,  diffuses  social  tensions  and  offers  desirable  opportunities  for 
interaction.  For  instance,  physical  aggression  and  armed  robbery  are  considered 
violations of core justice. By contrast, some forms of opportunism (holding out, tax 
evasion or some forms of free riding) are offenses against consequentialist justice. To be 
fair, it is not always easy to draw the line. On the one hand, when consequentialist 
justice  consolidates  through  hundreds  of  generations,  evolution  is  most  likely  to 
transform its principles into core justice: in these cases, successful routines cease to be 
instruments and become moral principles. On the other hand, it may well happen that 
some elements of core justice are sidestepped when they are manifestly conducive to 
conflicts and economic decline: over time some ethical principles are thus shelved as 
moral anachronisms. Likewise, some institutional arrangements may no longer satisfy 
their original purpose or live up to expectations. If so, they lose their legitimacy and 
may decay, especially when their moral foundations contrast with core justice.  
 
For our purposes, one may observe that the principles of fairness and social justice that 
have characterized widespread support for the European-styled welfare states over the 
past decades are too recent to be part of core justice. Therefore, since these principles 
are not embedded in our genetic pool, they could be revised or simply rejected relatively 
rapidly. What about health? Does this apply to our views on the provision of health-care 
as well? 
 
From a historical perspective, charity directed at other members within the community 




are  involved.  Yet,  we  doubt  that  it  has  ever  been  an  element  of  core  justice  to  be 
enforced  at  all  costs.  Surely,  mean  behaviour  has  frequently  provoked  moral 
disapproval, but until the beginning of the 20
th century it never justified the use of 
violence.  Governments  were  not  legitimized  in  forcing  individuals  to  be  charitable 
against their will. By contrast, and consistent with the rise of the doctrine of social 
equality, in the second part of the past century democracy has rapidly been accepted as 
the most desirable political structure. Sharing the common wealth, therefore, has turned 
up to be (consequentially) just, since it has been regarded as part and parcel of the 
democratic  context  and  of  the  social  contract  it  implied.  Furthermore,  compulsory 
sharing did not create major tensions with our sense of core justice. Easy access to 
health care was (and is) consistent with our sense of moral obligation; and it was made 
bearable by adequate rates of economic growth, so that a high degree of redistribution 
did not reduce the disposable incomes of those who were supposed to foot the bill. 
Today, however, the balance between the core and the consequentialist components of 
justice  seems  to  have  become  more  fragile.  As  long  as  we  agree  that  government 
intervention  in  health  matters  is  justified  by  consequentialist  justice,  and  once  it 
becomes  apparent  that  such  intervention  does  not  meet  people’s  expectations,  state-
managed health-care loses at least part of its legitimacy. Thus, if the conflict with the 
shared  notion  of  core  justice  sharpens,  the  underlying  institutional  context  will  be 
perceived as obsolete and will eventually undergo radical reform. 
 
We  conjecture  that  nowadays  the  case  for  consequentially-just  health  care  might 
actually be facing a crisis. True, most people would not articulate their apprehension in 
terms of justice and are rather inclined to frame it in terms of financial stringency. Yet, 
one cannot deny that the debate about institutional inadequacy is already under way. 
The value of democracy as an effective device to avoid violence by the autocrat is not 
disputed; but it is also increasingly apparent that its substitute – violence made legal by 
majority  consensus  –  is  not  always  regarded  as  just  in  the  term’s  core  sense. 
Disenchantment  and  unease  follow:  people  realize  that  income  redistribution  is  not 
equivalent to wealth sharing and that rent-seeking meets neither consequentialist, nor 




playground for rent-seeking activities and the higher its cost in a stagnant economic 
environment,  the  more  clearly  its  social(ist)  components  appear  unjust.  Should  this 
come to pass, looking for alternatives would no longer be understood as a betrayal of an 
alleged social contract, but rather as the search of new ways of conceiving of legitimate 
social arrangements and of reducing the gap between moral relativism prompted by 
expediency and our core sense of justice. Health remains indeed a special area in the 
assessment of one’s moral obligations towards the other members of society, but the 
justification for a socialist solution would definitely lose the appeal it had at its birth. In 
short, social concerns for human flourishing might be about to backfire. Rather than 
enhancing spiritual alertness and individual flourishing, social concerns for flourishing 
have  generated  rent-seeking  structures,  multiplied  transaction  costs  and  –  more 
importantly – created tensions with our (sleeping) sense of core justice. 
 
 
5  Summary and conclusions 
In  the  recent  past,  much  of  the  debate  on  the  looming  breakdown  of  government 
finances in large parts of the Western world has focused on finding acceptable ways of 
containing public expenditure and possibly raising taxation. The accepted strategies on 
the expenditure side can be summarized in three lines of action: reforming the state-
pension system,  freezing the budget for education, and containing health-care costs. 
Yet, reality seems to be unfolding in a different direction and the recent financial crisis 
has helped to understand why: an overblown socialist environment leads to collapse 
when the economy loses flexibility and fails to transform technological opportunities 
into  entrepreneurial  ventures  and  thus  growth.
21  Public  expenditure  is  indeed 
problematic. But low growth and stagnation are worse. As history confirms, when it 
comes  to  reducing  the  expenditure/GDP  ratio,  expanding  the  denominator  is  more 
important that squeezing the numerator. Put differently, hope of avoiding bankruptcy 
rests  with  the  ability  to  grow,  which  requires  a  new  notion  of  fairness,  extensive 
                                                 
21  In  particular,  the  recent  financial  crisis  has  shown  that  the  larger  the  welfare  state,  the  lower  the 




deregulation,  deep  reform  of  most  tax  systems  and  the  drastic  downsizing  of  the 
incumbent  rent-seeking  structures.  Future  redistribution  will  not  have  to  reproduce 
hypothetical choices made behind a veil of uncertainty, but instead make it easy for 
people to bridge the gap between their starting points and a set of minimal socially 
shared goals (the essence of targeted redistribution). Despite its weight, therefore, the 
cost of government intervention in the health-care industry is not the main source of 
problems  for  our  welfare  systems.  True,  if  it  came  to  the  worse,  gradual  transition 
would offer the obvious technical solution: as the axe falls on subsidies, patients’ claims 
to the right of choice among competing providers would be favoured, opting out of 
mandatory health contracts encouraged and the size of state-managed health-case supply 
downsized following the decline in demand. Yet, we have tried to show, all this is 
unlikely  to  happen,  for  transition  is  barred  by  the  strong  and  deep  rent-seeking 
structures that today characterize most health systems grown along Lord Beveridge’s 
tradition or that have absorbed some of its elements. These sizable and powerful groups 
of privileged individuals ensure that privatization remains politically difficult to obtain, 
while  high  transaction  costs  and  limited  trust in  the  judiciary  keep  the  pressure  for 
transition low. That explains not only why the world of Beveridge is not sustainable, but 
also why it won’t be abandoned unless people change their perception of the role of the 
state  and/or  the  most  detrimental  features  of  rent-seeking  are  deemed  intrinsically 
immoral and thus delegitimized.  
 
This is actually the second element to which we have drawn attention: transition to light 
forms of paternalism or to an outright free-market conception remains problematic as 
long as it can rely on consequentialist justice. Until recently, generic claims in favour of 
efficiency and public finance have not been compelling enough to accept privatization. 
Decade after decade, the rent-seeking game has succeeded in producing large coalitions 
of winners (political elites and civil servants) and very large groups of people who did 
not really know whether radical reform will see them on the winning or the losing side. 
These large groups have now come to realize that transition would make society better 
off in the medium and long run. Yet, as societies grew old, the relevant time horizon for 
the median individual became shorter and the prospect of taking a chance and suffering 




(that will inherit our debt) proved all but irresistible. This was of course both rational 
and hypocritical. Sadly enough, by arguing in favour of social fairness and by preferring 
rent-seeking to growth, we have actually obliged our children to work for our creditors 
or  to  declare  bankruptcy.  That  very  rent-seeking  game,  however,  has  seriously 
hampered our prospects for growth, and today’s financial stringencies might change our 
perspective  once  again.  If  that  happens,  the  consequentialist  connotation  of  social 
justice might crumble. Should this happen, large chunks of the welfare state – including 
government  production  of  health-care  –  might  collapse  and  the  notions  of  human 
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